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What Role for “Women,” “Men,” 
and Transpeople/Intersex People 
in Gender Equality?:  
A Commentary 
 
Edward Stein* 
 
This has been a very rich opening panel to what promises 
to be a terrific conference. The panelists’ comments go in such 
varied directions that it is a challenge to be both a 
commentator and summarizer, especially when I have just a 
few minutes to speak. What I plan to do is say a little bit to 
draw together some of the themes that the panelists have been 
talking about that are connected to a couple of topics I have 
been working on while at the same time trying to look forward 
to some of the things I hope we are going to be talking about 
the rest of the day. 
I have been returning to some questions relating to 
immutability, about which Janet Halley and I were both 
writing in the early nineties. I recently reread Janet’s Stanford 
Law Review paper on that topic,1 which was very influential for 
my thinking. Some of these issues in that article relate to 
biological theories of the origins of sexual orientations and 
their relevance to constitutional law arguments in U.S. 
contexts. Some of the ideas that animate that article may seem 
outdated—for example, the discussion of essentialism and 
constructionism about sexual orientation2 is cast in a different 
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1. Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A 
Critique of the New Argument from Immutability, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 503 
(1994). 
2. For some classic essays that frame the date about essentialism and 
constructionism at the time, see FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY (Edward Stein, ed. 1990). See 
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way than it is typically framed today and much has changed 
about the legal framework of the relevant U.S. constitutional 
law.3 But some of the questions present in that article remain 
live questions today and we are grappling with them on this 
panel. We are talking about gender, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, sexual desire, and sexual behaviors more 
generally. These phenomena are manifest in humans, who are 
complex creatures with many characteristics and rich cognitive 
lives. The characteristics of individual humans can change, 
sometimes through choices that we make, sometimes through 
the environments that we are in, sometimes as a result of 
economic forces, and sometimes through medical procedures on 
our bodies that are undertaken willingly or unwillingly. The 
categories that we use for thinking about ourselves and the 
world also change. They change over time, they change with 
new discoveries, and so forth. So although we take for granted 
the categories of sex, gender, race, gender identity, and sexual 
orientation, we need to realize that these categories are also 
changing. These categories for describing people are also used 
in the law and by legal systems, and they can be used in the 
law in ways that can both oppress or liberate. How we think 
about these categories and how we can and do change them is 
something that people on this panel have been talking about in 
useful ways. 
When scholars, myself included, are thinking about the 
law, gender, sexuality, gender identity, and the like in a 
theoretical way, we often do so from the particular legal context 
in which we find ourselves. We are talking about U.S. law—in 
this context, for example, same-sex marriage in the United 
States or immutability as it plays itself out in the U.S. 
constitutional context. Looking forward to the next panels, 
what I am hoping will happen in the conference today is that 
we will continue to look at gender and sexuality in both a 
comparative way (as some people on this panel have started to 
do) and from the perspective and context of international law. 
 
also EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY AND 
ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 71-116 (1999). 
3. For example, Halley’s essay was written before Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/4
2011] PANEL ONE COMMENTARY 823 
 
Part of what I hope we will be doing going forward is using 
these perspectives to think outside of our particular cultural 
categories and, thereby, impact how we think about this 
complicated set of issues that we have started talking about on 
the panel today. 
I hope these brief remarks have drawn together some of 
the questions that people on this panel have talked about while 
anticipating the conversations that we will be continuing to 
have today. 
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